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I.  INTRODUCTION
Partner notification and contact tracing are well-established public health
interventions designed to reduce the incidence of new cases of sexually trans-
mitted diseases.1 The idea behind such programs is to inform the sexual and
drug-using contacts of infected patients of their potential exposure so that the
chain of infection can be broken.2  After researchers discovered that HIV could
be transmitted sexually, there were calls to implement partner notification
and/or contact tracing programs as public health interventions.3  While there
have been several analyses of whether partner notification programs are appro-
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1. See Larry Gostin, Traditional Public Health Strategies, in AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR
THE PUBLIC 47, 54-58 (Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds., 1987) (discussing case identification through
screening and contact tracing); see also ALLAN M. BRANDT, NO MAGIC BULLET: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
VENEREAL DISEASE IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1880 150-52 (1985) (describing contact epidemiology
as a traditional approach to communicable disease, and documenting how contact tracing became
part of the war on syphilis beginning in the 1930s); INSTITUTE OF MED., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988 81 (1988) (describing venereal disease statutes in many
states that give public health officials the power or duty to inquire about a person’s previous and
current sexual partners).
2. See BRANDT, supra note 1, at 150; see also INSTITUTE OF MED., supra note 1, at 82 (postulating
that voluntary contact notification programs can be useful in preventing the spread of HIV).
3. See, e.g., Donald P. Francis & James Chin, The Prevention of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syn-
drome in the United States: An Objective Strategy for Medicine, Public Health, Business, and the Commu-
nity, 257 JAMA 1357, 1361 (1987) (stating that contact tracing and partner notification will help to
provide “appropriate education and motivation of the infected and susceptible contacts, [in order
that] further transmission can be prevented”).
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priate public health policy for HIV/AIDS,4 few have focused specifically on the
effects, both good and bad, that such programs have on women.
This Article analyzes HIV partner notification programs, giving special
emphasis to their gender implications.  Part II of this Article describes different
types of partner notification programs, focusing on contact tracing programs.
Contact tracing programs constitute the typical manner in which partner notifi-
cation interfaces with public policy; the state must decide whether it will imple-
ment this sort of program as a public health intervention.  By contrast, the other
types of partner notification programs, provider referral and patient referral no-
tification, likely will continue to be implemented in private by individual doc-
tors.  Part III of the Article examines contact tracing through the lens of bioethics,
introducing three principles of bioethics—beneficence, respect for autonomy,
and justice5—and how contact tracing would be viewed in light of these princi-
ples.  It is important to remember, however, that while each principle should be
satisfied on its own, there are times when satisfying one necessarily means com-
promising another.6  In such cases, the principles must be weighed in terms of
their importance.7  This Article examines the extent to which contact tracing pro-
grams satisfy these principles generally, and then addresses the extent to which
they satisfy the principles specifically for women.  Finally, Part IV provides rec-
ommendations for public health policy.
II.  PARTNER NOTIFICATION PROGRAMS
Partner notification programs identify and inform the sexual and/or drug-
using partners of a patient identified with an infectious disease.8  Contact tracing
programs are a mainstay of public health, having been used historically to help
contain the spread of many other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), 9 and
they can be implemented in several ways.  Contact tracing programs are carried
out by public health departments or the patient’s own doctors.10  Typically, doc-
tors report the names of individuals infected with legally reportable STDs to the
4. See, e.g., Ronald Bayer & Kathleen E. Toomey, Health Law and Ethics: HIV Prevention and the
Two Faces of Partner Notification, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1158, 1159-60 (1992) (describing the history
of different approaches to partner notification and the ethical dilemmas inherent to each).
5. These principles were articulated in NATIONAL COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND
GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 4 (1979); see also TOM L.
BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 58, 170-73 (3d ed. 1983)
(discussing these bioethical principles).
6. See Tom L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 105 (4th
ed. 1994) (“[W]e treat principles as both prima facie binding and subject to revision. . . .  The latitude
to balance principles in cases of conflict leaves room for compromise, mediation, and negotiation.”).
7. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 5, at 128 (“[T]here must be proportionality or a
favorable balance between the good and bad effects of the action.”).
8. See Francis & Chin, supra note 3, at 1361.
9. See BRANDT, supra note 1, at 151; see also Jon K. Andrus et al., Partner Notification: Can It Con-
trol Epidemic Syphilis?, 112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 539, 542 (1990) (describing sex-partner notifica-
tion in the control of syphilis).
10. See INSTITUTE OF MED., supra note 1, at 81.
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public health department.11  The public health department then contacts the in-
fected individuals and asks them to provide the names of all sexual or drug
contacts they have had over a given period of time;12 all of the persons named
are contacted by the public health department and are informed that they might
have been exposed to the disease at issue.13  While some states require the re-
porting of HIV/AIDS infection, and some of those have contact tracing or part-
ner notification programs, no state allows the unwilling disclosure to contacts of
the name of the original patient who had provided the contact’s name.14  Con-
tacts are encouraged to be tested for the disease themselves, and those found to
be infected are asked to provide names of their contacts, who are informed of
their potential exposure to the disease and are offered testing.15  The process
continues until all contacts are notified and have been counseled about testing
and risk reduction. Public health departments are expected to be non-
judgmental in their execution of contact tracing by focusing on the goal of pre-
venting the further spread of infectious disease.
The two main partner notification techniques are provider referral and pa-
tient referral programs.16  In provider referral programs, patients’ own doctors
notify the contacts;17 they ask patients the names of their contacts, and, only with
the patient’s knowledge and permission, inform the contacts that they have been
exposed to an infectious disease, never identifying the source patient by name.18
By contrast, patient referral means that after a patient is found to have an infec-
tious disease, the patient is asked by doctors to inform all of her partners her-
self.19  In some instances, counseling is provided to help patients learn how to
carry out this sometimes difficult or awkward task.20
11. See MARTIN GUNDERSON ET AL., AIDS: TESTING AND PRIVACY 141 (2 Ethics in a Changing
World, 1989) (observing that reporting laws “facilitate contact tracing” and that reporting laws and
contact tracing by public health departments relieve physicians of the dilemma of whether to break
patient confidentiality).
12. See INSTITUTE OF MED., supra note 1, at 81.
13. See id.
14. See GUNDERSON ET AL., supra note 11, at 141 (stating that “all states with such [contact trac-
ing] programs protect the confidentiality of the infected person”).
15. See Bayer & Toomey, supra note 4, at 1159 (explaining the scope of partner notification as
originally envisioned in 1936).
16. See id. at 1160; see also James T. Dimas & Jordan H. Richland, Partner Notification and HIV
Infection: Misconceptions and Recommendations, 4 AIDS & PUB. POL’Y J. 206, 206 (1989) (stating that the
contact tracing alternatives are “patient referral and provider referral.  Under the patient referral
model . . . health care providers encourage index patients to notify their partners directly . . . .  Using
[provider referral], the . . . health care provider is responsible for notifying partners that they may
have been exposed to HIV.”).
17. See Dimas & Richland, supra note 16, at 206.
18. See Bayer & Toomey, supra note 4, at 1158.  The paradigmatic case of provider referral is the
doctor who informs the unsuspecting wife of a bisexual man that her husband is HIV-infected and
that she is at risk.  See id. at 1161.
19. See Kathleen E. Toomey & Willard Cates Jr., Partner Notification for the Prevention of HIV In-
fection, 3 AIDS S57, S57 (1989 Supp. 1).
20. See id.
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III.  THREE PRINCIPLES OF BIOETHICS
A.  Beneficence
The first principle, beneficence, means that persons have the responsibility
to do good for others, to prevent harm to others, or, at the very least, to avoid
directly harming others.21  Beneficence also requires the balancing of harms and
benefits that might result from a given policy to determine whether or not, on
balance, the policy is beneficial.22  It is out of beneficence that contact tracing (or
any other public health program) would be suggested.  The goal of contact trac-
ing programs is to prevent additional cases of HIV, and this unquestionably is a
goal with good, or “beneficent,” intent.  The next relevant questions, then, are
how effective contact tracing programs are in achieving this goal, and whether
there are negative consequences also associated with contact tracing programs.
That is, to what extent do contact tracing programs satisfy the principle of be-
neficence?
This Article attempts to establish that for a contact tracing program to be ef-
fective in preventing new cases of infection, all five of the following assumptions
must be satisfied: 1) the index patients must know and be willing to disclose the
names of their contacts, and it must be possible to locate the contacts; 2) a sig-
nificant proportion of the persons contacted must not have known already that
they had been exposed to HIV, and they must have been practicing unsafe prac-
tices before and be willing to change to safer practices now; 3) a significant pro-
portion of the persons contacted must be willing to be tested; 4) some number of
those found to be HIV-infected will not have known already that they were in-
fected; and 5) some number of persons found to be HIV-infected must have been
practicing unsafe practices before being contacted who will change to safer
practices after being informed of their potential exposure.
The extent to which these assumptions have been met in the case of contact
tracing for HIV is unknown, largely because there are few published studies
evaluating contact tracing programs in those terms.  The studies that have been
conducted typically reported health department efforts to trace the contacts of a
single infected person.23  Several studies and commentators suggest that, given
the expense, contact tracing programs reach the zenith of their appropriateness
in relatively low-risk settings, perhaps where an individual might not suspect
that he or she was exposed to the infection, or where numbers of contacts are
21. See Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters, Ethical Theory and Bioethics, in CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 1, 30 (Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters eds., 4th ed. 1994).
22. See id. at 32.
23. See, e.g., K. Waldron et al., Notification of Syringe-Sharing and Sex Partners of HIV-Infected Per-
sons—Pennsylvania, 1993-1994, 44 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 202, 202-03 (1995)
(describing the contact tracing of drug and sexual partners of one HIV-infected man in prison in
Pennsylvania: “follow-up of the four partners of the index patient and all subsequently identified
partners of HIV-infected persons identified a social network of 124 persons linked by syringe-
sharing and/or sex . . . . [S]taff spend 2 ½ to 10 hours locating and interviewing each contact.  The
estimated cost . . . for partner notification of this network was $13,969.”); Randolph F. Wykoff et al.,
Contact Tracing to Identify Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in a Rural Community, 259 JAMA
3563, 3564 (1988) [hereinafter Wykoff et al., Contact Tracing] (describing a rural South Carolina con-
tact investigation tracing 83 sexual contacts of HIV-positive men).
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small.24  In high risk settings, by contrast, it has been suggested that all persons
should be encouraged to seek testing, rather than just those identified through a
contact tracing program.25  Indeed, while contact tracing has been feasible (that
is, contacts could be located) in many settings, it is virtually impossible in others.
One study examined sexually transmitted disease contact tracing in Oregon.26
Investigators found that contact tracing was an effective disease control mecha-
nism for gonorrhea but not for syphilis.27  They attributed the difference in effec-
tiveness, first, to the fact that the period in which one can be infectious is much
longer with syphilis28 and therefore someone with syphilis could have infected
many more partners during that time.  Second, people with syphilis were more
likely than people with gonorrhea to have had anonymous sexual partners who
therefore could not be named.29  It generally will be more difficult to name and
locate partners in settings where individuals have had multiple and/or anony-
mous partners, and in settings where drug use plays a major role.30  For example,
a study of heterosexual partners of persons with AIDS (PWAs) in San Francisco
(a city considered to include many persons at high risk for AIDS) reported that
fifty-six percent of the contacts that investigators had attempted to locate either
had died, had refused to participate, or had moved out of town.31  Indeed, the
resource-intensity of contact tracing programs typically makes them impractical
on a large scale.32
24. See Andrus et al., supra note 9, at 542 (reporting that those afflicted with gonorrhea had
fewer and more easily-identifiable sexual partners and implying that contact tracing would be better
suited as a prevention mechanism among gonorrhea, as opposed to syphilis, sufferers); Francis &
Chin, supra note 3, at 1361.
25. See Francis & Chin, supra note 3, at 1361.
26. See generally Andrus et al., supra note 9, at 539, 542-43 (evaluating why the same infection
control measures with both syphilis and gonorrhea in the state of Oregon resulted in no change in
gonorrhea rates but a 159% increase in syphilis).  The study concluded that “[b]ecause patients in-
fected with syphilis have relatively large numbers of anonymous sexual encounters, prevention
strategies that supplement partner notification are urgently needed to control the syphilis epidemic
among adults.”  Id. at 539.
27. See id. at 541-42.
28. See id.  The researchers also observed that “because syphilis has a longer infectious period
than gonorrhea, patients with syphilis are more likely to have a greater number of partners from
further in the past . . . .”  Id. at 542.  HIV also has a lengthy incubation period.  See Allan M. Brandt,
Sexually Transmitted Disease: Shadow on the Land, Revisited, 112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 481, 482
(1990) (noting that “[s]tate-mandated partner notification appears unlikely to effect positively the
course of the HIV epidemic . . . .  [T]he long period of infectiousness of HIV as well as the current
inability to render persons noninfectious further diminishes the potential advantages of tracing con-
tacts”); George W. Rutherford et al., Partner Notification and the Control of Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Infection: Two Years of Experience in San Francisco, 18 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 107, 109
(1991).
29. See Andrus et al., supra note 9, at 542.
30. See Toomey & Cates, supra note 19, at S59.
31. See Rutherford et al., supra note 28, at 108.
32. See Gostin, supra note 1, at 57 (observing that “contact tracing requires . . . a fair investment
of time; it is ill-suited for use on a large scale . . . .  [M]andatory contact tracing . . . with the attendant
threats to confidentiality and the sheer numbers involved, is impractical.”).
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Another study in rural South Carolina followed the contact tracing process
for 25 index patients.33  The index patients named 207 partners who resided lo-
cally, and 202 of them agreed to counseling and testing.34  About one-third of
those found to be infected previously had suspected that they might have been
exposed to HIV.35  Seventy-seven percent of contacts said that the contact tracing
program had been helpful, while seven percent said it had been harmful, mostly
because of the depression they experienced once they learned that they might
have been exposed to HIV.36 A different report based on this same study found
that both HIV-positive and HIV-negative partners increased condom use from
none to eighty percent and sixty-nine percent, respectively, after being con-
tacted.37
In the San Francisco study,38 51 HIV-positive index patients who were re-
ported to the health department identified 135 opposite-sex sexual partners in
the preceding five years.39 The 59 partners contacted by the study were inter-
viewed and offered testing.40  Compared to index patients, the partners were
more likely to be women and to be younger.41  Of these partners, 26 women
agreed to be tested and 3 (twelve percent) were found to be positive, compared
to 6 men who agreed to be tested and 4 (sixty-seven percent) were found to be
positive.42
The South Carolina study examined 84 female and 401 male sexual and
needle-sharing partners of HIV-infected individuals.43  Investigators found that
sixty-three percent of the females and fifty-seven percent of males agreed to be
tested for HIV, with twenty-one percent of the women testing positive, as com-
pared to seventeen percent of the men.44  For 36 HIV-positive participants who
were re-interviewed at least once during the six to twenty-four month follow-up
period, the number of named contacts decreased eighty percent from a mean of
5.6 to 1.1.45  For 101 HIV-negative participants who were re-interviewed, there
was a fifty percent decrease in number of named contacts, from 4.0 to 2.0.46
These latter results were not analyzed separately by gender.
Several studies have examined the impact of contact tracing programs spe-
cifically on women.  One study conducted in Mexico suggested that contact
33. See Jeffrey L. Jones et al., Partner Acceptance of Health Department Notification of HIV Exposure,
South Carolina, 264 JAMA 1284, 1285 (1990).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See Wykoff et al., Contact Tracing, supra note 23, at 3566.
38. See Rutherford et al., supra note 28, at 107.
39. See id. at 108.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See Randolph F. Wykoff et al., Notification of the Sex and Needle-Sharing Partners of Individuals
with Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Rural South Carolina: 30-Month Experience, 18 SEXUALLY
TRANSMITTED DISEASES 217, 219 (1991).
44. See id. at 219.
45. See id. at 220.
46. See id.
KASS 06/10/98  10:09 AM
THE ETHICS OF CONTACT TRACING PROGRAMS 95
tracing programs can be beneficial particularly to women;47 this result likely fol-
lows from the fact that women are significantly less likely than men to know
they are at risk of contracting HIV.  In this study, some women were notified
that their male partners had HIV and other women were not.48  The women who
were notified were significantly more likely to modify their sexual behavior and
to avoid intercourse than the women who had not been notified.49  The epidemi-
ological literature reveals that women who are infected via sexual contact with
infected male partners are a growing proportion of the HIV-infected popula-
tion.50 For some women, their only risk factor is the behavior of a male partner
with whom they are monogamous.51  Not knowing that they may be at risk,
many women do not seek testing until “the discovery of a partner’s risk [or] dis-
closure of risk.”52
These studies suggest that persons who are informed by contact tracing
programs that they might have been exposed to HIV generally are grateful to
have been informed, and a sizeable portion did not know that they might have
been exposed.  A sizeable proportion then report that they started to use con-
doms when previously they had not.
B.  Respect for Autonomy
The second principle, respect for autonomy, means that people must be re-
spected as autonomous agents who have the right to make decisions for them-
selves without interference from others.53  It is this principle that creates a moral
right to privacy and, in turn, a right to decide whether, when, and to whom to
release personal information.54  In the medical profession, there is a lengthy his-
tory of maintaining confidentiality in the doctor-patient relationship.55  Concerns
47. See WOMEN AND HIV/AIDS: AN INTERNATIONAL RESOURCE BOOK 233 (Marge Berer & Su-
nanda Ray eds., 1993).
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See, e.g., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., NO. 1, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT 8 tbl.3 (1997) (showing that women increasingly
are constituting a greater proportion of AIDS cases); Tedd V. Ellerbrock et al., Heterosexually Trans-
mitted Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection Among Pregnant Women in a Rural Florida Community,
327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1704, 1704 (1992) (finding that “[i]n the United States, women account for an
increasing number and percentage of the cases of the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS)
among adults”).
51. See Lorraine Sherr, Psychosocial Aspects of Providing Care for Women with HIV Infection, in HIV
INFECTION IN WOMEN 107, 108 (Howard Minkoff et al. eds., 1995).
52. Dooley Worth, Women at High Risk of HIV Infection: Behavioral, Prevention, and Intervention
Aspects, in BEHAVIORAL ASPECTS OF AIDS 101, 102 (David G. Ostrow ed., 1990).
53. See Beauchamp & Walters, supra note 21, at 28-29.
54. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 5, at 319; see also generally Scott Burris, Testing, Dis-
closure, and the Right to Privacy, in AIDS LAW TODAY: A NEW GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 115, 131-34 (Scott
Burris et al. eds., 2d ed. 1993) (discussing in great detail confidentiality, privacy, and limits to pri-
vacy).
55. See Richard Belitsky & Robert A. Solomon, Doctors and Patients: Responsibilities in a Confiden-
tial Relationship, in AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 201, 201 (describing the tension between the
duty to disclose in order to protect third parties and the responsibility to safeguard the patient’s
confidentiality within a context in which “[p]hysicians have long considered the duty to safeguard a
patient’s confidences a paramount concern”).
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about invading privacy and maintaining confidentiality historically have led to
the harshest criticisms of contact tracing programs.56  Strictly speaking, privacy
can be preserved by individuals’ simply choosing not to disclose their partners’
names.57  It is not clear, however, how well individuals understand that when a
public health department official asks them to provide a name, they will not be
penalized for refusing to comply.  That is, while public health officials ask indi-
viduals to comply by providing the names of their contacts, there is no penalty
for refusing.  If individuals are not aware of this, they potentially provide names
against their will or better judgment.  Indeed, it may be true that individuals
who are more sophisticated about their rights will be less likely to comply with
contact tracing programs, while those who are less sophisticated will believe that
they have no choice.  In addition, although public health officials are never re-
quired to reveal individuals’ identities58 and have a strong record of preserving
confidentiality,59 some contacts, especially those who have had only one sex or
needle-sharing partner, would have little difficulty deducing the identity of the
original patient who had provided his or her name.  Moreover, contacts are un-
der no similar mandate to maintain confidentiality.  If a contact knows the index
patient’s name, there is nothing to stop the contact from disclosing the index pa-
tient’s name and HIV infection status to others.  Generally, the greater the num-
ber of people who have confidential information, the greater the likelihood that
there will be an unauthorized release.
The possibility that the contact will know the identity of the index patient is
of particular concern to women as index patients, for whom the consequences of
disclosure may be particularly severe.60  Women may choose not to disclose that
they are HIV-positive because they fear losing their children,61 they distrust
service agencies,62 or they fear being stigmatized.63 Results from qualitative in-
56. See, e.g., Brandt, supra note 28, at 481-82 (observing that, although partner notification has
been considered “an important element of public health policy to control epidemic disease,” it has
“rarely been systematically evaluated,” and emphasizing that individuals need to be found who can
be brought into care, yet “[t]o ask persons to voluntarily name contacts when neither the index pa-
tient nor the partner are adequately protected from discrimination or assured of adequate services
will lead to suspicion and justifiable skepticism among those at greatest risk”); Lawrence O. Gostin
et al., The Case Against Compulsory Casefinding in Controlling AIDS—Testing, Screening and Reporting,
12 AM. J. L. & MED. 7, 19, 23-24, 46 (1987) (stating that compulsory screening engenders personal
costs, including restricting individuals’ right to privacy and to control access to personal informa-
tion, and that these personal costs are likely to outweigh any public benefit).
57. See Bayer & Toomey, supra note 4, at 1158 (“[Contact tracing] was formally predicated upon
the voluntary cooperation of the patient in providing the names of contacts . . . .”).
58. See id.
59. See INSTITUTE OF MED., supra note 1, at 81.
60. See Karen H. Rothenberg & Stephen J. Paskey, The Risk of Domestic Violence and Women with
HIV Infection: Implications for Partner Notification, Public Policy, and the Law, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1569, 1570 (1995) (“Forty-five percent of all providers surveyed had at least one female patient who
expressed fear of physical violence resulting from disclosure of her diagnosis to a partner, while
56% of providers had patients who expressed fear of emotional abuse and 66% had patients who
expressed fear of abandonment.”).
61. See Michael Pizzi, Women, HIV Infection, and AIDS: Tapestries of Life, Death, and Empowerment,
46 AM. J. OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY 1021, 1022 (1992).
62. See id.
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terviews with fifty HIV-infected women echo some of these themes: two-thirds
of the women interviewed were afraid to tell others of their infection because
they feared rejection, violence, discrimination, and public ignorance of the dis-
ease.64  These women expressed concern that their infection would become
“general knowledge” and feared negative social consequences if others knew
that they were HIV-infected.65  For example, a man was rumored to have been
killed when his neighbors learned he was ill;66 a woman was assaulted on the
street when others in her neighborhood heard that she was infected.67
These examples illustrate that maintaining confidentiality is a critical con-
cern, and difficult to ensure.  Disclosing to their male partner was difficult for
some of the women in this study and two (four percent) did not tell their part-
ners out of fear of violence.68  Even when women voluntarily disclose their
status, there is evidence that negative consequences may ensue.  In a study of
257 HIV-infected women, adverse social and physical consequences of living
with HIV, such as being rejected by partners, family members, and friends, or
being verbally, sexually, or physically assaulted, were examined.69  Virtually all
of the women in this study had disclosed their status to others,70 and forty-four
percent reported experiencing negative consequences.71  Moreover, as the num-
ber of people to whom the women disclosed their status increased, their risk of
experiencing negative consequences increased.72
Policies such as contact tracing, therefore, in which individual autonomy
inevitably is compromised, should factor in the known risks of harm when such
data are available.  As more is learned about the consequences of disclosure for
women, contact tracing programs should use this information to build in neces-
sary safeguards.
63. See, e.g., Gill Green, Attitudes Towards People with HIV: Are They As Stigmatizing As People
with HIV Perceive Them To Be?, 41 SOC. SCI. MED. 557, 557 (1995) (stating that people with HIV are
“doubly-stigmatized” because they have a fatal, infectious disease that is prevalent especially
among gay men and drug users who are already subject to prejudice—they are seen as dangerous to
others because the disease is contagious, and because they are blamed for their condition); Andrea
Carlson Gielen et al., Women’s Disclosure of HIV Status: Experiences of Mistreatment and Violence in an
Urban Setting, WOMEN & HEALTH, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1997, at 19, 25-28 (discussing concerns raised by
HIV-positive women when asked about their personal experiences with disclosure) [hereinafter
Gielen et al., Women’s Disclosure].
64. See Gielen et al., Women’s Disclosure, supra note 63, at 25.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 26.
67. See id. at 27.
68. See id. at 26.
69. See Andrea Carlson Gielen et al., Women Living with HIV: Disclosure, Violence and Social
Support 6-7 (1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy).
[hereinafter Gielen et al., Women Living with HIV].
70. See id. at 5.
71. See id. at 6.
72. See id. at 7.
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C.  Justice
The third principle, justice, requires that people be treated fairly;73 restric-
tions cannot be imposed on, or benefits provided to, one person or one group of
people when another similarly-situated person or group is treated differently
without adequate justification.74  In the context of public policy, this means that a
policy cannot disproportionately impact, either favorably or unfavorably, any
particular subpopulation without appropriate justification, and the implementa-
tion or execution of the policy must be fair.75  For example, a contact tracing pro-
gram cannot trace only the contacts of homosexuals, or only for the contacts of
Medicaid patients, unless there is sound scientific justification.  One study sug-
gests that contact tracing policies indeed are not implemented fairly; doctors
surveyed indicated that variables such as gender, race, and sexual orientation
would influence a decision to maintain or to violate patient confidentiality.76  In
this study, physicians were given case descriptions of hypothetical HIV-infected
patients whose identities were altered in terms of their race, gender, and sexual
preference, while all other aspects of the case remained identical.77  In the small
study sample, physicians were five times more likely to violate patient confi-
dentiality when the patient was a black, heterosexual male than when the pa-
tient was a black, homosexual female.78  These findings suggest that physicians
may execute their responsibilities with regard to contact tracing inconsistently
depending on the demographics of their HIV-infected patients.
A broader justice question, and of particular relevance to women, is
whether contact tracing programs have differential impact on diverse groups in
terms of the harms or benefits they impart.  While contact tracing programs may
be beneficial for women who are HIV-negative, such programs potentially are
harmful for HIV-positive women.79  As described above, women are at greatest
risk for contracting HIV when they are unaware that their male partners are in-
fected.  Given that contact tracing programs are designed expressly to inform
contacts who might otherwise be unaware of their potential exposure, unin-
fected women stand to benefit from the implementation of contact tracing pro-
grams.  Since women are at greater risk of heterosexual transmission than are
men,80 it stands to reason that heterosexual women are more likely than hetero-
sexual men to benefit from contact tracing.  While a disproportionate benefit of-
ten indicates that a proposed program is unjust, the disproportionate benefit is
73. See Beauchamp & Walters, supra note 21, at 32.
74. See id. at 33.
75. See id.
76. See Judith A. Schwartzbaum et al., Physician Breach of Patient Confidentiality Among Individu-
als with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Infection: Patterns of Decision, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
829, 833 (1990).
77. See id. at 829.
78. See id. at 830.
79. See INSTITUTE OF MED., supra note 1, at 82; Rothenberg & Paskey, supra note 60, at 1571.
80. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
NO. 2, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT 10 tbl.3 (1996).
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not unjust if there also is a disproportionate need or risk,81 as there seems to be
for HIV-negative women.82
For the smaller (compared with HIV-negative) but nonetheless significant
proportion of women who are HIV-positive, however, contact tracing can pose
serious risks to their safety if a male partner becomes violent after being in-
formed of the woman’s status.83  This fear of violence is a concern with contact
tracing that appears to impact women disproportionately.84  Juxtaposing anec-
dotal reports of women being assaulted or killed as a result of being identified as
HIV-positive85 with what is known about the prevalence of domestic violence
more generally,86 difficult questions are raised about balancing the potential
public health benefits of contact tracing with the risks of the tracing to women.
Physical and sexual assault of women is not uncommon; recent national surveys
indicate that approximately twelve percent of women reported being physically
assaulted by an intimate male partner at least once in the previous year, and
physical violence occurs in twenty-eight percent of all marriages in the United
States.87  Violence in interpersonal relationships poses more risk to women than
to men;88 women are at greater risk than men for intimate partner violence that
results in serious injury or death.89
Studies of women whose sociodemographic characteristics are similar to
those of women at greatest risk for HIV (that is, minority women living in low-
income, urban areas) have found that as many as thirty-four percent of women
report having experienced domestic violence.90  Sexual assault typically is not in-
cluded in measures of domestic violence, but lifetime prevalence estimates of
sexual assault are generally at about twenty percent.91  In a sample of 257 HIV-
positive women, sixty-two percent reported having been physically or sexually
81. Cf. Beauchamp & Walters, supra note 21, at 32-33.
82. This claim is based on women’s being more likely than not to contract AIDS through het-
erosexual contact.  See Ellerbrock et al., supra note 50, at 1707.
83. See Rothenberg & Paskey, supra note 60, at 1571.
84. See id. at 1574.
85. See Richard L. North & Karen H. Rothenberg, Sounding Board: Partner Notification and the
Threat of Domestic Violence Against Women with HIV Infection, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1194, 1195
(1993).  The authors report two cases in which women were shot as a result of having disclosed their
HIV status, and other cases of injury to women resulting from disclosure.  See id.
86. See generally UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 23-48 (Nancy A. Crowell & Ann
W. Burgess eds., 1996) (discussing violence against women).
87. See id. at 31, 34.
88. See G. Hale-Carlsson et al., Physical Violence and Injuries in Intimate Relationships—New York,
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System 1994, 45 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 765, 765
(1996) (stating that although the rate of reported violent acts appear similar for women and men,
women report more injuries than men).
89. See UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 86, at 7.
90. See Nancy E. Gin et al., Prevalence of Domestic Violence Among Patients in Three Ambulatory
Care Internal Medicine Clinics, 6 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 317, 318-19 (1991); see also Vivian B. Brown et
al., Mandatory Partner Notification of HIV Test Results: Psychological and Social Issues for Women, 9 AIDS
& PUB. POL’Y J. 86, 91-92 (1994) (discussing results of research conducted as part of an intervention
trial to reduce drug use and HIV transmission in women); Andrea Carlson Gielen et al., Interpersonal
Conflict and Physical Violence During the Childbearing Year, 39 SOC. SCI. MED. 781, 784 (1994)
(discussing evidence of prenatal and postpartum domestic violence in these socioeconomic groups).
91. See UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 86, at 32.
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assaulted, including twenty-seven percent who had been raped.92  Assaults of
either type (physical or sexual) that were reported to be directly attributable to
being HIV-positive were reported by four percent of the sample.93
There are insufficient data with which to make definitive judgments about
the benefit/harm ratio of contact tracing for women.  On the one hand, contact
tracing programs do appear to be effective in reaching women and getting them
tested in instances where women may be unaware of their risk exposure.94  This
benefit is clearly important, given that the rate of HIV infection through hetero-
sexual transmission in women is increasing rapidly.95  There appears to be no
data on psychosocial or violent consequences for women who are contacted
when a male index case discloses her name; this is an area for future research.
There is, on the other hand, a growing body of research that suggests that
women infected with HIV suffer social harms and seriously are concerned about
disclosure of their own status to others.96  Given these findings and the extent to
which domestic violence against women in general is prevalent suggests the
need for building safeguards into any contact tracing program.
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS
First, if a contact tracing program is implemented, it must have a mecha-
nism to screen for a history or risk of domestic violence.  There have been sig-
nificant improvements in domestic violence screening in clinical settings.  For
example, the Joint Committee on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations
(JCAHO) requires screening within hospitals;97 the American Medical Associa-
tion (AMA) encourages physician screening;98 and in California, licensed pri-
mary care clinics are required to have domestic violence screening protocols.99
The extent to which public health programs routinely screen for domestic vio-
92. See Gielen et al., Women Living with HIV, supra note 69, at 7-8.
93. See id. at 9.  While this issue has been framed in terms of the HIV-positive woman being the
index case, similar concerns could arise when a man learns that he is HIV-positive and blames his
own infection on his female partner.  There are no data available, however, to determine how often
this scenario occurs and what its consequences are.
94. See Rutherford et al., supra note 28, at 108 (demonstrating that a large number of women
partners of HIV-positive index patients were tested).
95. See Ellerbrock et al., supra note 50, at 1704.
96. See, e.g., Pizzi, supra note 61, at 1022 (noting that HIV-positive women may avoid disclosing
their status for four reasons: (a) concurrence with the societal perception that AIDS, is an illness of
gay men and IV drug users, does not really affect women; (b) fear of losing custody of their chil-
dren; (c) distrust of health care services; and (d) the failure of health care providers to reach out to
women); see also North & Rothenberg, supra note 85, at 1195 (describing incidents of domestic vio-
lence toward and abandonment of HIV-positive women); Rothenberg & Paskey, supra note 60, at
1571 (reporting data from a North Carolina study of partner notification that illustrated lack of co-
operation by HIV-infected in alerting their sexual partners to their condition).
97. See Anna E. Waller et al., Development and Validation of an Emergency Department Screening
and Referral Protocol for Victims of Domestic Violence, 27 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 754, 755 (1996).
98. See Robert E. McAfee, Physicians and Domestic Violence: Can We Make a Difference?, 273
JAMA 1790, 1790 (1995) (discussing the AMA’s emphasis on diagnosis and prevention of family
violence as an important public health priority).
99. See Ariella Hyman et al., Laws Mandating Reporting of Domestic Violence: Do They Promote
Patient Well-Being?, 273 JAMA 1781, 1781 (1995) (discussing the need for increased awareness of
domestic violence by clinicians and policy makers).
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lence, however, is not known.  If a contact tracing program were to be imple-
mented, public health officers must be trained to seek names of contacts when
first speaking with index patients, to conduct domestic violence screening with
both women and men, and to not inform contacts in cases where there is signifi-
cant risk.  As in other screening programs,100 referral and support services then
need to be available for individuals identified as being at risk for domestic vio-
lence.  As Karen Rothenberg and Stephen Paskey have suggested, index patients
should be allowed to consent to the notification of their contacts due to the risk
of domestic violence.101
Second, public resources must be channeled into programs that target pri-
mary prevention of HIV infection in men.  Given women’s primary risk fac-
tors,102 preventing men from becoming infected will, in turn, be important in
preventing women from becoming infected.  This is not to say that resources
should be taken away from programs targeted to women, but that attention
should focus on why women are at increasing risk of HIV infection.103
Finally, more research must be conducted in many areas to better inform
these debates.  Before the gender implications of contact tracing programs can be
properly evaluated, more research is necessary to suggest whether contact trac-
ing programs are effective in reducing the number of incident cases of HIV and,
if so, in which types of settings and for which populations. Research is needed to
determine the extent to which HIV-infected men and women already disclose
their infection to their partners and the extent to which they understand that
their contacts might learn their identities through a public health notification
program.  Further research is needed to determine whether certain subpopula-
tions disproportionately are burdened or helped as a result of contact tracing
programs, including whether this is the result of unjust implementation.  And,
finally, research is needed to examine the extent to which HIV plays a factor in
the already too high rates of domestic violence in this country.
V.  CONCLUSION
Scarce information makes it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of contact
tracing programs.  Specifically, it is not possible to determine whether contact
tracing programs are implemented fairly (fulfilling the principle of justice), nor
the extent to which programs accomplish public health goals (beneficence) or
violate individuals’ privacy or other interests (respect for autonomy).  Existing
studies indicate that contact tracing programs are more likely to be effective in
settings where most contacts do not know they were exposed to HIV and in set-
tings where index patients do not have many anonymous or transient partners.
The limited research conducted in this area does not make clear the implications
for women.  It is reasonable to believe that women who are HIV-negative and
have had a partner who is HIV-positive would benefit from contact tracing pro-
100. See Waller et al., supra note 97, at 754 (describing efforts to develop an emergency depart-
ment protocol for the identification, documentation, and referral of victims of domestic violence).
101. See Rothenberg & Paskey, supra note 60, at 1573.
102. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
103. See Krystn Wagner & Judith Cohen, Programs and Policies for Prevention, in UNTIL THE CURE:
CARING FOR WOMEN WITH HIV 228, 229 (Ann Kurth ed., 1993).
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grams, while potentially some women who test positive for HIV will be harmed,
or, at the very least, will fear harm, from the prospect of having their HIV status
revealed to others.
The steps that should be taken for the future in this area of public health
policy are, first, to determine whether contact tracing programs generally pro-
vide more benefit (preventing new cases of HIV) than harm (compromising in-
dividual interests) based on beneficence obligations.  Second, to the extent to
which contact tracing programs are believed to be beneficial, they must be im-
plemented only in conjunction with mandatory screening policies for domestic
violence.  Similarly, out of respect for autonomy, index patients—male and fe-
male—must be counseled on the risks and benefits of having health officials lo-
cate their contacts, and must be assured that they need not provide names of
their contacts if they believe that doing so would put them at risk of either emo-
tional or physical harm.
The decision whether to implement a contact tracing program, like other
public health policies, needs to be based on broader considerations than those
addressed in this Article, such as whether the proposed program is the best ap-
proach, given limited resources, to achieve the intended goal.  Should further re-
search determine that, in some communities, contact tracing is a better use of
limited public dollars than other HIV prevention measures, such programs
should only be implemented if they are sensitive to the needs of women who
potentially could be harmed by such programs.
